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Abstract: Mining causes severe adverse effects such as pollution and forced resettlement. Accordingly,
it has prompted conflicts that are also evident in China. Our study assesses whether and how rural
residents’ engage in environmental activism (EA) against mining. This is achieved by constructing
a model of EA strategies, coupled to variables that examine respondents’ intentions. The model
uses data from a survey (n = 352) covering 37 villages spread over 5 provinces and 1 provincial-level
municipality. The model is based on a refinement of the theory of planned behavior (TPB). Various
findings are reported: (1) a majority of respondents (77%) believes that pollution in the mining areas
is serious; (2) there is pessimism about the effects of EA with 41% believing it does not improve the
environment, and less than one-fifth feeling the government supports EA, contradictorily; (3) well
over half has engaged in one or more forms of EA, while (4) dominant EA strategies consist of
complaining to local government or village authorities (both over 40%), or open protest (opted for by
over 17%); (5) economic dependency and gender affect the intention for EA, as those employed in
mining and women are less inclined to participate. Whereas studies pointed to “inclined abstainers”
or the “silent majority”, this study ascertains that—with regard to mining—rural residents are not
silent. We posit that a threshold of environmental endurance might have been reached. In this context,
policymakers need to tackle the adverse effects of mining, as it is likely to generate more violent
confrontations that ultimately pose risks to political credibility and social stability.
Keywords: mining; environmentalism; farmers’ resistance; social conflict and protest
1. Introduction
Environmental pollution in China has reached alarming levels and is severely affecting public
health in the country [1–3]. Facing increasing ecological degradation, environmental activism (EA) has
been growing, either in the form of activism driven by environmental non-governmental organizations
(ENGOs) or more localized grievance-driven social mobilization. Since the 1990s, China has witnessed
a rapid rise in ENGOs [4–6], while grievance-driven activism by pollution victims has also proliferated.
For example, the number of environment-related petition letters increased from 58,678 in 1995 to
701,073 in 2010 [7] (p. 2). China’s cities also witnessed an increase in protests over waste incineration
and chemical plants [8–11], coupled to protests against industrial pollution in the rural areas [12,13].
Previous studies on environmental activism in China have predominantly focused on
ENGOs [4–6,14–16], explaining its emergence, organization, and capacity. Environmental activism
against polluting firms initiated by affected victims has also attracted academic attention. Scholars
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have illustrated how economic dependency complicates the relationship between pollution and
protest [12,17], whereas other studies pinpointed the difficulties to redress pollution grievances via
formal complaints [18,19], legal routes [12,20,21], and collective protests [22,23].
Although there is a large amount of literature examining environmental activism in China,
a systematic examination of individuals’ attitude and exposure to environmental issues in relation to
the likelihood of and chosen form of activism is scant. This study seeks to answer these questions by
employing a widely used social psychological model, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) [24,25].
This research is based on a demographically and economically diversified survey answered by
352 farmers living in the vicinity of mines in 37 villages dispersed over eight counties.
The findings indicate that there is a high awareness of the severity of pollution, as well as of the
environmental and health risks. Moreover, the level of environmental activism is high with 55.7%
of the respondents having taken one or more different forms of action against mining. When rural
residents undertake action, they frequently opt for collective protests in addition to complaining to
local state authorities and the village committee. Neighbors’ participation plays an important role
while the intention to engage in EA and the perception of the severity of pollution are also important
in explaining individuals’ engagement in EA.
Situated in the context of mining in rural China, this study’s findings might contribute to a deeper
understanding of the participation in environmental activism in general, and in the Chinese context
in particular. Mining, on the one hand, has long been suggested as a complementary livelihood to
alleviate rural poverty [26–29]. On the other hand, as mining competes with other uses of land, it poses
significant threats to rural livelihoods such as through dispossession of land and disruption of the
ecosystem [30,31]. It should also not be forgotten that mining has significant direct and indirect impacts
on rural land conversion [32–35]. In light of the dilemma between the economy and environment,
this study may provide important lessons for other developed and developing economies that rely
on mining.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a literature review on environmental
activism in China. The section thereafter discusses the research design of this study, including the
analytical framework, fieldwork sites, and data collection. Section 4 presents the empirical findings
and discussion. The final section concludes the paper.
2. A Review of Environmental Activism
Environmental or green activism can be distinguished between ENGO-driven activism and
grievance-driven social mobilization [11,36]. While ENGOs are mostly motivated by a more general
concern over national and global environmental grievances, the latter is usually the result of a
“personal complaint” [37] (p. 119). The two types are often contrasting, as most ENGOs tend to
organize their activities with long-term goals in mind and promote wider public and environmental
interests. In contrast, “personal complaint” environmental activists are more concerned about
defending their personal interests against environmental threats and gain justice in compensation
procedures [36,38–40].
Since the 1990s, China has witnessed a sharp increase of ENGOs [4–6]. This has been attributed to
the ecological modernization and the “greening of the state” at the macro-level [15,41], but also to social
networks (guanxi) at the micro-level [16]. Financial support and expertise provided by international
ENGOs also explain the rise of local green activism in some regions [42,43]. While the number of
ENGOs is growing fast, they are limited in their capacities and resources [4,14,16]. Within China’s
semi-authoritarian political context, ENGOs have adopted a more “embedded” form of activism,
which is expressed in a focus on “reforms from the within”, by targeting politically less sensitive issues,
while fostering guanxi with sympathetic Party-state officials [4,14]. In result, ENGOs by and large
adopt non-confrontational strategies towards the government and refrain from too openly debating,
criticizing, or questioning the state’s policies, to avoid being labeled as “political” organizations and
having to suspend activities.
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More isolated environmental activism by affected citizens have also proliferated in more recent
years, for instance, as can be witnessed by the protests over waste incineration and Paraxylene plants
in urban areas [8–11] or protests against industrial pollution in rural China [12,13]. It has become clear
that local social, economic and political circumstances strongly influence Chinese citizens’ responses
to pollution, most clearly demonstrated by the varying strategies adopted in China’s urban and
rural areas.
First, while mining and other industries bring about severe pollution, they often also bring
employment opportunities to rural residents. Several studies [44–46] have pointed to instances where
rural dwellers have become financially dependent on compensation payments from local polluters,
reducing their willingness to resist against environmental degradation. Meanwhile, incinerators could
bring multiple benefits for urban dwellers, for example, efficiently reduce waste using fewer land
resources, and generate energy by burning waste. However, these benefits are often less discernible
and therefore also less likely to influence urban citizens’ actions [11] Second, the different degrees of
economic dependency of rural and urban residents on polluting industries result in varying outcomes.
Previous studies show that rural residents mostly respond passively to tangible pollution (i.e., evident
to human sensory perception) [12,13,35]. Contrarily, resistance to waste incineration and Paraxylene
plants in urban areas is often preemptive as it often occurs at the planning stage of the plants [8,11].
Third, the available resources between rural and urban victims also differ. Due to the urban-rural
gap, the “digital divide” (that is, the level of internet usage) [47], and the limited media coverage in
rural areas, urban residents are more likely to initiate online mobilization and obtain support from
ENGOs and lawyers [11,48]. Contrarily, pollution victims in the rural areas are usually more isolated
and without the support of third parties [12].
The dependency on local polluters has an impact on how the victims frame their grievances
and claim compensation. For example, Jing [13] illustrated how rural residents initiated protests
to protect the ecological basis of human existence, instead of framing their grievances in health or
environmental terms. This is also evident in the cases where pollution-affected residents actively strive
for financial compensation [45,49,50], and, in certain instances, stage protests to secure material gains
from polluters and local officials, instead of asking for environmental improvement or the closure of
plants [13,51]. In other cases, farmers have become so economically dependent on the polluters that
they took no action and chose to live with the pollution despite the adverse effects on health, such as
cancer, respiratory problems and other illnesses [52].
Difficulties, fears, and previous experiences also explain why citizens and farmers are unwilling
to take actions against polluting activities. Litigation against polluters are paired with formidable
obstacles within and beyond the court [12,20,21,53]. Procedural obstacles, such as providing evidence
of the damages and the causality between mining and environmental effects, as well as high fees
for the acceptance of cases, deter citizens from taking further action [12,20]. Activists often have
trouble framing their actions as legitimate, especially when local authorities claim a legal basis for
imposing punishment.
The perceived chance of success also influences the motivation to engage in environmental
activism. Research has found that filing complaints to environmental protection bureaus is often
in vain, as they tend to focus on tangible nuisance complaints that are easily addressed and with
immediate effect, while steering away from more deep-rooted violations [18,19]. Moreover, it is
difficult to win a case in courts where local protectionism is pervasive [54–56]. Lastly, protests may
invoke suppression from local governments, where participants—and especially the leaders—are often
charged with the crimes of racketeering and inciting a mob [22].
Despite these obstacles, the government is generally the main party to which farmers turn to.
As evidenced by other studies [35,57], instead of complaining to or negotiating with mining companies,
Chinese farmers are more likely to approach the local governments. Moreover, in addition to
oft-observed suppression and concessions to polluters, the local state also employs wealth distributing
strategies to cope with resource conflicts, such as by providing employment opportunities and
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social welfare benefits to the communities [57]. In this context, the government’s attitude towards
environmental activism plays a crucial role in farmers’ participation in EA.
At the global level, recent forms of activism in the mining industry includes referendums, which
emerged as a strategy in the 2000s and was increasingly used by communities in Latin America [58,59].
Other strategies, such as taking a transnational mining company to court at the host state or international
courts [60], and the “glocalization” of mining conflicts by connecting to international NGOs and global
issues, such as climate change [61–63], have also been observed. However, in (semi)authoritarian
settings, such forms of mobilization are seldom practiced. In China, environmental activism features
as a fragmentary, de-politicized and highly localized phenomenon [64]. It is why we adopt a notion of
activism, including an “embedded activism”, often employed in the Chinese context [65–67], and which
will be further elaborated in the next section.
There are relatively few studies that measure the modes of actions in relation to social grievances
in China in general [68,69], or environmental grievances in particular [65,66]. From the available
studies, some general conclusions can be drawn. First, there is a significant “silent majority”, a group
of residents that does not take any actions even when exposed to pollution and environmental
degradation (For example, in the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey, among 3,878 self-identified
pollution victims who had suffered harm due to environmental pollution, more than 61% did not
take any action [60] (p. 122). For general grievances, the survey yielded a percentage of 33.1 of the
respondents who took no actions [59] (p. 466)). Second, seeking mediation through acquaintances,
village and state authorities is the most commonly used way to deal with environmental grievances.
Resorting to legal action is less favored, and engaging in protests is even less opted for in China
(In fact, the participation in protests is very low, for example, one study yielded a percentage of 0.65%
of all the surveyed respondents [60] (p. 123), while, in other studies [58,59], protest was not even
separately listed in the survey results). Studies have also examined the influence of demographic and
socio-economic characteristics on the self-identification of pollution victims and their actions [65,66].
The key finding is that the well-educated, and those with a relatively high income and social capital,
are more likely to participate in environmental protection activities.
While these studies help to understand the patterns of social conflicts and modes of actions,
a systematic examination of individuals’ motives to engage in activism—with particular reference to
rural China—is still under-researched. This study aims to fill this gap through a model based on a
readjustment of the theory of planned behavior to study the strategies and intention for environmental
activism against polluting mines [25,70]. The adopted theory, and the study’s methodological
considerations, are further discussed in the next section.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Analytical Framework
Many models have been developed to explain environmental behavior [25,70–72]. The underlying
assumption for most models is that individuals make rational choices that maximize their benefits
and minimize their costs. In this regard, an influential framework is the Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) [25,70], which suggests that the most proximal determinant of an individual’s behavior is his or
her intention. In turn, this intention is predicted by three components: the attitude, subjective norms,
and perceived behavior control. According to the theory, individuals who hold pro-active attitudes,
believe that there is normative support for their action, and those who perceive that they can easily
perform their action, are most likely to have an intention that eventually drives them to accomplish
their behavior.
In the field of environmental activism, the TPB might have theoretical and practical implications.
By testing theoretically-based hypotheses about the determinants of certain behavior, we might
contribute to gain a better understanding of environmentalism. TPB has been applied in and supported
by studies on many different forms of environmental action, for example, antinuclear activism and
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participation in environmental groups [73–75]. For some behaviors and contexts, the inclusion of other
variables may increase the predictability of the model. For example, self-identity, the perception of
health risks, and information have been added in previous studies and successfully helped to increase
the explanatory power of the model [67,71,76]. For this study, the initial TPB model is adopted and
further adjusted to the needs of the study in line with the existing literature. The analytical framework
that we use is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. An analytical framework for planned behavior. Source: Drawn by authors.
Strategies for EA: As mentioned above, environmental activism is often distinguished
into ENGO-driven activism and individual, grievance-driven activism. Previous studies treat
environmental activism as a function of the behaviors and interactions with an environmental
organization [71,75] (for example, Tindall et al. [66] (p. 910) explicitly define environmental activism
as “specific movement-supporting activities that are promoted by environmental organizations”,
such as participation in events organized by NGOs, financial contribution to an environmental group,
participation in protests, and voting for pro-environmental groups). As this study focuses on the
individuals that embark on collective action, we operationalized this by constructing a set of nine,
possible EA strategies (derived from previous studies on protests against mining in China [65–67]).
The set consists of: approaching the village committee (EA1), approaching the township government
(EA2), approaching environmental protection bureaus (EPB) by letter (EA3), by visiting (EA4),
directly negotiating with the mines (EA5), resorting to the media (EA6) or the judicial system (EA7),
participating in a protest against the mines (EA8), and abstaining from applying for a job in the mines
(EA9). Respondents were asked whether they had engaged in any of these pre-defined items. For each
item, a binary score is assigned, where the sum of the nine items is used to estimate the degree of EA,
leading to a total score between 0 and 9 for every respondent.
Intention for EA: The TPB assumes that an individual’s behavior is determined by his or her
intention, i.e., a correlation between intention and behavior [24]. Often, when it is not possible to
measure actual behavior, studies looked at the respondents’ intention as a proxy to engage in that
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behavior [77–79] (in the field of marketing, when certain measures have not been deployed and
therefore no actual behavior can be measured, the intention of paying a premium price to consume,
the WTP or Willingness To Pay, is assessed to find out consumers’ acceptance of, for instance, renewable
energy or food labeling [69,70]). However, studies have also indicated the problem of “inclined
abstainers” [80], i.e., those who were inclined to perform a certain behavior but did not act accordingly.
To address this issue, the present study examines both the intention to engage in EA, as well as the
self-reported behavior (operationalized through the aforementioned nine EA strategies).
The attitude towards environmental behavior is measured by two key variables: the perception
of the severity of pollution and concerns over health risk (as a measure of the level of environmental
degradation). Two additional variables, the perception of neighbors’ participation and the social
appreciation of EA are constructed as reflecting subjective norms. The term neighbor is defined
as residents living next door or very close to the respondent, and that are not relatives or friends.
Perceived behavior control is represented by the individual’s perception of the difficulty to perform
the behavior, and the internal and external efficacies. Internal efficacy refers to beliefs that individual
participation can help to prevent an environmental problem, while external efficacy refers to the
beliefs of external actors’ support to resident’s environmental activism [81,82]. Following this, two
variables are constructed in the model: self-reported effectiveness of EA, and government support
to EA. A five-point Likert scale was designed to measure the degree of each factor, with 1 = lowest,
and 5 = highest (Table 1). The control variables are the demographic variables, consisting of gender,
educational level, age, and economic dependency on mining operationalized as employment.
Table 1. Definition and valuation of variables in the study (for more information on the variables, see
the Appendix A).
Variable Description of the iTem Valuation
Environmental activism level Sum of (EA1–EA9) 0–9
SERIOUSNESS Perception of severity of pollution
1 = Lowest;
5 = highest
HEALTH Perception of health risks of pollution
NEIGHBOR Perception of neighbors’ participation in EA
APPRECIATION Social appreciation of EA
EFFECTIVENESS Effectiveness of EA efforts
SUPPORT Degree of government support to EA
INTENTION Willingness of EA against polluters
3.2. Study Sites
The fieldwork was conducted in eight counties across five provinces and one provincial-level
municipality (Figure 2), respectively Binxian and Hancheng county (Shaanxi Province, Shuozhou
county (Shanxi Province), Yanzhou and Tengzhou county (Shandong Province), Peixian county
(Jiangsu Province), Xiushan county (Chongqing Municipality), and Huayuan county (Hunan Province).
The counties were selected from an official list of mineral resource-abundant counties designated by
the Chinese State Council [83], with the aim to represent and account for (i) various stages of mineral
resource exploitation (four stages are distinguished in this paper following a report by the State
Council: (i) the emerging stage (Shuozhou, Binxian); (ii) maturing stage (Hancheng, Jining, Xiushan,
Huayuan); (iii) exhaustion stage (Tengzhou); and (iv) mine reclamation or recovery stage (Peixian));
(ii) geographical variety (China’s vast geographical areas are represented as follows: (i) the east coast
(Jiangsu and Shandong Province), (ii) Northwest (Shanxi and Shaanxi Province), and (iii) Southwest
(Hunan Province and Chongqing Municipality). These areas are covered by plains, arid steppes,
and mountainous areas); (iii) varying levels of economic development (regional disparities exist among
the selected provinces, with relatively wealthy eastern coastal provinces (Jiangsu and Shandong),
and the relatively poor inland provinces (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hunan, and Chongqing); and (iv) different
mineral resources (the two counties in Chongqing Municipality and Hunan Province are ranked among
the nation’s largest producers of zinc, lead, and manganese, while the other six are predominantly
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involved in coal mining). In each county, four to five villages were selected, totaling 37 villages. In the
Chinese context, a rural community typically consists of an administrative village (xingzheng cun)
or a natural village (ziran cun). The village community plays a decisive role in resource allocation,
especially with regard to the distribution of agricultural land, and in some cases, the distribution of
compensations for land expropriation and resettlement.
Figure 2. Map of fieldwork sites. Source: Drawn by Kees Krul.
It needs mentioning that EA against mining is highly sensitive in China. The primary data were
extremely difficult to obtain, while local government and mining companies at times actively aimed
to cover up certain conditions and circumstances. In this context, we particularly sought to protect
the rights and interests of the respondents, and the survey and interviews did not record or store
personal data. The research was overseen by the Ethics Officer of the European Research Council and
an independent Human Research Ethics Committee of the university. No interview or survey was
carried out without prior informed consent from the respondent.
3.3. Characteristics of the Sample
A total of 352 valid questionnaires was collected. The survey was carried out between May and
September 2015 by a team of specially trained, local undergraduate students, supervised by one of the
authors. To ensure the quality and reliability of the survey, the student interviewers were randomly
spot-checked. A non-probability sampling approach was used by going from household to household
while group meetings were intentionally avoided. Per household, one respondent was selected and
interviewed. Although the sample was not representative, a higher degree of representativeness was
ensured via theoretical saturation to determine the size of the sample, up to the point where additional
data provided no additional insights into the research questions [84,85]. Moreover, a higher degree of
validity (data accuracy) and reliability (data consistency) was sought through the purposive selection
of the research sites. An overview of the sample characteristics is presented in Table 2. A total of
121 respondents, or 34.4% of the sample, indicate that their immediate family members work or have
worked for mining companies. The data were recorded in SPSS (Version 24, IBM, Armonk, NY, USA:
2016), and different statistical analyses were performed, at significance level p < 0.05.
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Table 2. Characteristics of the survey sample.
Characteristics Group Number Percentage (%)
Male 239 67.9
Gender Female 113 32.1
Age
18–30 38 10.8
31–60 194 55.1
>61 120 34.0
Education
Illiterate 69 19.6
Primary school 99 28.1
Middle school 125 35.6
High school and above 61 16.7
Household size
≤3 104 29.5
4–5 123 34.9
≥6 125 35.6
Mean 4.92
Employment in Mines Employed in mines 121 34.4
Not employed in mines 231 65.6
Source: This survey.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Predicting Variables
Figure 3 presents the key variables defined in the analytical framework. Mining is a severely
hazardous industry, affecting land and water resources while producing toxic waste and pollutants.
The majority of respondents (77.3%) believe that environmental pollution is serious (Mean = 4.03).
An even higher percentage (85.4%) is concerned with the risks of pollution to their health (Mean = 4.17).
The high scores indicate that local residents consider pollution in the mining areas as very serious.
Figure 3. Statistical summary of the predicting variables (n = 352) (the survey questions are included
in the Appendix A). Source: This survey.
Facing environmental pollution, the respondents show a relatively high intention to engage in EA,
with a Mean of 3.45. Similarly, a Mean of 3.08 suggests a moderate extent of neighbors’ participation,
about half of the respondents believe that their neighbors participate in EA. The farmers feel that their
endeavors would be moderately appreciated by other people, as suggested by a Mean average of 3.18.
Nevertheless, the outcome of EA is not seen as promising, as 41.4% believes that EA could not help
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to improve the environment. Moreover, only 19.5% thinks that the government and environmental
agencies support residents’ EA practices, with a low score of 2.28.
4.2. Resident’s Environmental Activism
Figure 4 provides the occurrence of nine EA strategies adopted by individuals. The dominant
strategies are to complain to the township government (42.0%) or the village committee (41.2%).
Other favored ways included direct negotiation with the mining company (21.4%), complaints to
environmental protection bureaus by letters or phone call (20.6%), as well as open protests (17.3%).
Less favored were direct visits to environmental protection agencies (12.8%), the use of the media
(7.1%) and courts (2.6%). Only a marginal group of people (1.4%) considered not applying for a job at
the mining company as a way of EA.
Figure 4. Frequencies of resident’s environmental activism (EA) (n = 352). Source: This survey.
The sum of the nine strategies was calculated to estimate a respondent’s degree of involvement in
EA, illustrated in Figure 5. The largest group (55.7%) had engaged in one or more forms of EA, with a
Mean of 1.64 (indicating that the surveyed rural residents participated on average in more than one
form of EA). In addition, close to one-tenth (9.4%) of the respondents appear to be “seasoned activists”
in terms of involvement in more than five of the nine EA forms. All in all, the general level of EA
is high.
At this point, there are two noteworthy issues: first, our study appears to disprove the notion of
the “silent majority” or “inclined abstainers” as reported in other studies on Chinese EA [65,66,68,69].
The marked difference with other studies could be explained by the fact that mining has induced
commonly felt problems with profound effects, such as land subsidence. Such problems affect
entire villages and townships, as illustrated in a recent article on mining-induced displacement
and resettlement [35] (see: Fieldwork Video Footage). When villagers are faced with problems at such
a scale, the collective organization of protests receives a strong stimulus. Second, the most commonly
used ways to address grievances in China are to approach state and village authorities, which does
concur with the previous studies. In light of the above, we believe that a certain threshold might have
been reached as a result of which rural residents refuse to further endure the adverse effects of mining.
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Figure 5. Degree of environmental activism (EA) (n = 352). Source: This survey.
4.3. Variances of Environmental Activism by the Control Variables
To understand the variance of EA in relation to demographic and economic variables,
an independent sample t-test or ANOVA test was conducted (Table 3). The t-test ascertains that
there is a significant difference between gender in EA level, as the average times that men engage in
EA is 1.88, significantly higher compared to women (1.12). Statistical analysis also ascertains that there
is a significant difference between those employed in mines and those who are not employed in mines.
Put differently, with a working history in mining, respondents are less likely to participate in EA. This
confirms other qualitative studies in rural China, where economic dependency undermines farmers’
motivation to protest against polluting industries [12,17].
Table 3. Environmental activism (EA) by control variables.
Control Variables EA Mean Significance(t-Test/ANOVA) Finding
Gender
Male 1.88 t = 3.613; p = 0.000 Significant
Female 1.12
Age
<30 1.63
F = 0.180; p = 0.835 Not significant30–60 1.59
>60 1.719
Education level
Illiterate 1.67
F = 0.093; p = 0.964 Not significantPrimary school 1.66
Middle school 1.57
High school and above 1.71
Employment Employed in mines 1.36 F = 2.101; p = 0.037 Significant
Not employed in mines 1.78
Source: This survey.
As for age, the middle-aged respondents reported an average of 1.59 times of EA participation,
slightly lower than the young (Mean = 1.63) and the elderly (Mean = 1.71), which may be explained
by the fact that the middle-aged respondents were the main labor force and more likely to work in
the mines. However, the difference is not statistically significant. For those who have enrolled in high
school and above, the average times of the EA is 1.71, while those who have a middle school education
show the lowest EA level. However, there is no significant difference between the levels of education.
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4.4. Result of the Path Analysis
The predictive model of EA was statistically tested by means of recursive path analysis using
stepwise Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Multicollinearity was first checked to make sure
that there are no highly correlated predicting variables. A variance inflation factor (VIF) of 10 or even as
low as 4 has been most commonly utilized to indicate excessive or serious multicollinearity [86] (p. 674).
In this study, VIF for all independent variables ranges from 1.26 to 2.07, which means multicollinearity
should not be a matter of concern in our regression.
In the first multiple regression analysis, all predictors were entered to identify which variables
would predict EA (the control variables, e.g., gender, are excluded in the regression). If the coefficients
are not significant at the 0.05 level, the paths are excluded in the final model. The path coefficients are
depicted in Table 4 and Figure 6. The direct effect of the predicting variables on the EA is observed
from the weight given by the path coefficient, which indicates the relative changes of EA corresponding
to any change of the independent variable. The explanatory variables are significant and account
only for 10.2% (R2 = 0.102) of the variance of the overall EA at 1% significance level. The EA level is
explained by three predictors: the perception of neighbor’s participation, the intention to engage in
EA, and the perception of the seriousness of pollution.
Table 4. Regression results of environmental activism (EA).
Dependent Variable Predictors
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients t Significance
B Std. Error Beta
INTENTION
(n = 352; R2 = 0.196,
F = 20.764, p < 0.01)
Constant 1.722 0.286 6.026 0.000
APPRECIATION 0.270 0.067 0.294 4.053 0.000
HEALTH 0.147 0.058 0.145 2.553 0.011
EA Level
(n = 352; R2 = 0.102,
F = 8.504, p < 0.01)
Constant −1.338 0.688 −1.944 0.053
NEIGHBOR 0.367 0.105 0.219 3.484 0.001
INTENT 0.276 0.120 0.142 2.299 0.022
SERIOUSNESS 0.241 0.113 0.130 2.1132 0.034
Source: The survey by the authors.
Figure 6. Path analysis results for explaining environmental activism (EA). Source: This survey.
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The perception of neighbors’ participation plays the most important role in explaining EA, with a
direct path coefficient of 0.219. This means that rural residents would like to act collectively against
the mines, in line with the high occurrence of protests as shown in Section 4.2. Contrarily, the intention
to engage in EA plays a less important role, which points to the fact that social pressures instead of
individual cognition are more central to understanding EA. Lastly, the perception of the seriousness of
environmental pollution could also trigger farmers’ actions.
Three variables in the original model—concerns over health risks, social appreciation of EA,
and government’s support to EA—have no direct influence on the level of EA. Among those,
the concerns over health risks and the social appreciation of EA have significant linkages with the
intention for EA, accounting for nearly 20% (R2 = 0.196) of the variance. This implies that health
concerns and social appreciation of EA would increase the likelihood of acting against polluting mines
and create a sense of urgency against imminent threats.
The regression indicates that the TPB is a useful theoretical model for our purposes. First, it confirms
the important role of subjective norms, i.e., the perception of neighbors’ participation, and social
appreciation of EA, in explaining farmers’ intentions and actual behavior. This is understandable in
collectivist societies [87] such as China, where social influences or social pressure can be an important
influencing factor. This may be particularly true when the pollution is imposed upon the rural community
where residents feel strongly attached to family and neighbors. Second, the findings confirm that the
perceived salience of environmental threats is positively associated with an individual’s involvement in
environmental activism [71,88].
Nevertheless, neither the perception of the effectiveness of EA efforts nor the degree of government
support has a significant correlation with either the intention for, or the actual behavior of, EA. This
has the following implications. On the one hand, it shows that rural residents lack confidence in
their own ability and distrust the government’s capability in negotiating pollution. Rural industrial
factories are the major driver of local economic development, and therefore local authorities, local
cadres, and even communities form a coalition in favor of the polluting plants. This explains why,
despite severe environmental risks, factories are allowed to continue their activities [89]. On the other
hand, although knowing that their environmental actions might be in vain, some rural residents still
opt for actions. This could, for instance, be observed in the case of petitioning, i.e., sending letters or
paying visits to higher authorities to gain the support of higher level officials, albeit rarely yielding
concrete results for the petitioners [90]. Moreover, in some cases, protests are initiated as a strategy to
secure material gains from polluters and local officials [13,51].
5. Conclusions
This paper has assessed rural residents’ participation in environmental activism in China’s
mining areas, which was achieved through the identification and quantification of their strategies
and intentions. The study found that the level of EA in the rural mining area is high, with the greater
majority having taken one or more forms of action against mines, while there is also a relatively high
occurrence of collective protests. Dependency on the mining industry complicates the relationship
between environmental pollution and EA. The study shows that rural citizens who have been employed
in the mining industry are less likely to participate in EA, which also counts for gender, with men more
likely to participate than women. The regression analysis shows that the EA level is best explained
by three predictors: neighbors’ participation, the intention to engage in EA, and the perception of
the severity of pollution. Perception of the neighbors’ participation plays the most significant role in
explaining the EA level.
The study benefited from the large sample size that has been obtained despite the high sensitivity
of mining in rural China. At the same time, the study’s findings are bound by several limitations. First,
despite the fact that a model of EA was operationalized and tested, the model is not comprehensive,
as indicated by the generally low fraction of variance explained in predicting EA. In future research,
social and physical contextual factors could be added to the model to increase its explanatory power.
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A second limitation consists of the fact that each type of action is allocated the same weight in the
current study. However, some actions are arguably more difficult to execute than others, and also vary
in frequency.
Having said this, the findings of this study may provide valuable information for policy-making.
For starters, our study indicates that environmental pollution in mining areas is perceived as severe by
local residents, raising deep concerns and calling for prompt government action for environmental
protection. Furthermore, the regression model confirmed that environmental activism largely depends
on the perceived level of collective choice, i.e., the perception of neighbors’ participation and the social
appreciation of EA. The high level of participation in environmental activism suggests that a sense for
environmental protection and claims for environmental justice might have reached a certain threshold.
While some actors might take action, others may use their resources to maintain the status quo or
choose to do nothing, the silent majority. However, our study did not corroborate this, and, in fact,
once a commonly shared perception amongst rural residents is formed, the collective organization of
protests and other forms of environmentalism might become a reality. This was amply demonstrated
in the areas where mining has induced wide-spread land subsidence affecting entire villages. In this
context, policy makers need to take immediate and concrete measures, for example, by enhancing
the participation of local residents in the decision-making over the operation of mines, the provision
of long-term benefit sharing schemes (e.g., pension, unemployment benefits and medical insurance),
the setting up of vocational training programs, and the establishment of funds for the compensation of
mining-induced damages and pollution. In the absence of these, it is likely that the externalities of
mining might pose substantial risks to the long-term credibility of China’s political system and social
stability [91].
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Appendix A
Variable Description of the Item Choices
EA Have you ever taken any actions listed below against thepolluting mines?
EA1 Report to the village committee? (xiang cunweihuifanying qingkuang?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA2 Report to the local township government? (xiang dangdi zhengfufanying qingkuang)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA3 Approach environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) by letter orphone? (xie xin huozhe da dianhua xiang huanbao bumeng tousu?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA4 Approach environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) by visit? (qinzidao huanbao bumeng shangfang tousu, qingqiu chuli)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA5 Directly negotiate with the polluting mines? (zhijie he wuran qiyejiaoshe, xunqiu buchang?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA6 Resort to the media? (xiang meiti baoguang?) Yes: 1;No: 0
EA7 Resort to the judicial system? (dui wuran qiye tichu falv susong,qingqiu sunhai peichang?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA8 Participate in a protest against the polluting mines? (canyu duowuran qiye de kangyi huodong?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
EA9 Abstain from applying for a job in the polluting mines? (buquwuran qiye yingping he gongzuo?)
Yes: 1;
No: 0
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SERIOUSNESS To what extent is the environmental pollution in your communityserious? (zai ni de juzhuqu huanjing wuran zongtishang shi)
1: none;
2: slight;
3: medium;
4: serious;
5: very serious;
HEALTH
Are you concerned that environmental pollution brings harm to
your life and health? (ni shifou danxin huanjing wuran gei ni de
shenghuo he jiankang dailai yingxiang?)
1: not at all;
2: slight;
3: medium;
4: concerned;
5: very concerned
NEIGHBOR
To what extent do you think that the neighbors have participated in
the actions against the polluting mines? (ni renwei zhouwei de linju
zai hezhong chengdu shang canyu le zhendui wuran qiye de xingdong?)
1 = Lowest;
5 = highest
APPRECIATION
To what extent do you think your environmental activism will be
acknowledged and appreciated by society? (ni renwei ni de huanbao
xingdong zai hezhong chengdu shang neng dedao shehui de renke
he zansong?)
EFFECTIVENESS
To what extent do you think the environmental activism could
improve the environmental quality? (ni renwei huanjing xingdong zai
hezhong chengdu shang neng gaishan huanjing de zhiliang?)
SUPPORT
To what extent do you think the environmental protection bureaus
deal with environmental complaints actively and effectively?
(ni renwei huanbao bumen zai hezhong chengdu shang neng jiji he
youxiao de chuli huanbao tousu?)
INTENTION
In order to improve environmental quality, to what degree are you
willing to take actions against polluting mines? (ni shifou yuanyi
weile gaishan huanjing er dui fujin de wuran qiye caiqu xiangying
de xingdong?)
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